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ABSTRACT: Richard Shusterman’s somaesthetics provides a 
disciplinary framework in which come together 
reflections on the body by the main philosophical 
traditions of the twentieth century; the paper 
investigates some relations with Plessner and 
philosophical anthropology, as well as the rediscovery of 
some of the themes of Baumgarten’s aesthetics. 
 
 
 “When Alexander Baumgarten coined the term 
‘aesthetics’ to ground a formal philosophical discipline,” 
writes Richard Shusterman at the very beginning of his 
essay “Somaesthetics: a Disciplinary Proposal,” “his aims 
for that discipline went far beyond the focus of what 
now defines philosophical aesthetics.”
1
 
 
The revisionary resumption of Baumgarten's proposal by 
Richard Shusterman has given rise to many new 
possibilities and opened new questions for historical 
studies and theoretical thinking in aesthetics. I limit 
myself in this paper to sketching a brief catalog of some 
of these issues. Among them I consider on one hand the 
use and the potential usefulness of the concept of 
“somaesthetics” for reconstructing our historical 
knowledge and interpretation of Enlightenment thought. 
On the other hand, from a more contemporary 
perspective, I will show how, in my opinion, 
Shusterman’s proposal leads to a fruitful encounter 
between the naturalism that drives Deweyan 
pragmatism and prospects of contemporary 
philosophical anthropology. 
 
After outlining the interrelationship between 
Baumgarten’s notions of “natural aesthetics” and the 
systematic discipline of aesthetics and highlighting the 
                                                 
1
 Richard Shusterman, “Somaesthetics: a Disciplinary 
Proposal,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 57, 
no. 3 (Summer 1999): 300; reprinted in Richard 
Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, 
Rethinking Art, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Roman & 
Littlefield, 2000), 262–83. 
practical side of Baumgarten’s systematic proposal, 
Shusterman criticizes its lack of any attention to the 
study, knowledge, care, and improvement of the body. 
He writes: “Of the many fields of knowledge therein 
embraced, from theology to ancient myth, there is no 
mention [in Baumgarten's work] of anything like 
physiology or physiognomy.”
2
 Shusterman clearly aims to 
remedy this lack in Baumgarten’s project; and in this he 
seems to complete or fulfill some historical trends that 
can be reexamined from the perspective of 
somaesthetics. 
 
First, one could propose that somaesthetics completes in 
some way the development that drives eighteenth-
century aesthetic thought in the sense of Herder's 
criticism that Baumgarten’s theory creates a philosophy 
based on the model of logic and therefore not a 
philosophy of the scholar or “learned” man. In other 
words, Baumgarten’s conception of aesthetics as the 
“younger sister of logic” would recall or evoke the image 
of an “abstract” reason, devoid of historical and social 
connotations, devoid of connection with the production 
of knowledge in human “praxis.” 
 
So Herder proposed a distinctive aesthetics construed as 
a “physics of mind or spirit” (Geisterphysik), i.e., an 
aesthetics that would provide a point of intersection for 
the physiological grounding of our knowledge and for the 
recognition of the cognitive value of the senses. The 
efforts made by Herder, by the young Schiller's “vitalist” 
writings, by Ernst Platner and the largest part of the 
Enlightenment’s anthropological theory sought to free 
our thinking from the division between physical 
anthropology and moral anthropology, offering instead, 
on the model of Greek sculpture, the image of a full, 
integral humanity, “des ganzen Menschen”: an aesthetic, 
political, educational model all at the same time. This 
model cannot be configured without giving great care to 
studying the specificity of the different senses (as Herder 
emphasized) and the relationships between the human 
body and its environment, considered in its physical 
                                                 
2
 Ibid., 301. 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  3,  I ssu e 2 ,  2012  
SO M A E S T H E T I C S  A S  A  D I S C I P L I N E  BE T W E E N  P R A G M A T I S T  PH I L O S O P H Y   
A N D  PH I L O S O P H I C A L  AN T H R O P O L O G Y  S a l v a t o r e  T e d e s c o  
 
 
 7 
components and emotional, aesthetic, and ethical 
implications—as found at least sketched in Schiller’s 
articulation of expressive movement 
(Ausdrucksbewegung) between voluntary and 
“sympatic” movement.
3
  
 
Shusterman's somaesthetics shares with the 
anthropology of the Spätaufklärung (late Enlightenment 
thought) this emphasis on the intimate union between 
“body” and “mind” as an activity of the living body: an 
activity ontologically rooted in the specific somatic 
relationship to the world but functionally articulated on 
a number of dynamic levels, a “fundamental ontological 
union” that becomes a “harmonic unity” among 
behavior, society, and the construction and reform of 
values.
4
 
 
Given what we have said, we might consider the 
aesthesiological intention that animates the late 
Enlightenment’s Geisterphysik as a significant step in the 
genesis of a somaesthetics. However, this 
Spätaufklärung reversal of the logical character of 
Baumgarten's aesthetic theory brought with it the loss of 
the “melioristic” component of his project. This is, in my 
opinion, where contemporary somaesthetics marks, 
through its adoption of melioristic Deweyan pragmatism, 
the most important trait of continuity with Baumgarten, 
re-opening in all its richness the original range of the 
science of sensory cognition, but also further enriching it 
through recognizing its somatic ground. 
 
It should be noted that in Baumgarten’s view the 
definition of aesthetics is not fulfilled with the 
announcement or articulation of the proposed science of 
sensory cognition. If this announcement is the 
enunciation of the first paragraph of the first section of 
Aesthetica, later, in section 14, Baumgarten explicitly 
                                                 
3
 Friedrich Schiller, “Über Anmut und Würde,” Neue 
Thalia (Jena, 1793), 3:115-230. 
4
 See Richard Shusterman, “Soma and Psyche,” The 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy 24, no. 3 (2010): 206. 
adds: “The end of aesthetics is the perfection of sensible 
cognition as such, that is to say beauty.”
5
 Aesthetics aims 
at the perfection of its object, which is sensory cognition; 
and such a perfectly structured sensory cognition, 
according to Baumgarten’s careful research, is ultimately 
beauty, which achieves real cognitive value, giving to 
sensibility independent cognitive meaning and rules. 
 
Leibniz's metaphysics, which underlies and animates 
Baumgarten’s aesthetics, always conceives of perfection 
as a dynamical development, an increase of ontological, 
cognitive, and experiential value, given that, according to 
Leibniz, “perfection” is at the same time an increase of a 
thing’s essence and promise of happiness. 
 
The melioristic project, which is integral to the Deweyan 
perspective of Shusterman's analysis of sense 
experience, is further enriched, at least in terms of 
historical foreshadowing, by additional components of 
Baumgarten's project that seem to be revived in 
somaesthetics’ view: especially the distinction between 
“vividitas” and “vita cognitionis.” 
 
While a large part of Baumgarten's theory is dedicated to 
a logical characterization of our sensory cognition and to 
showing how aesthetics highlights the “vividness,” that is 
to say, the “extensive clarity”, reached by the multitude 
of coordinated elements in our perception, Baumgarten 
also juxtaposes this property of vividness or clarity with 
what he calls the sensitive “life of knowledge,” which is 
perception’s ability to be translated into action. In this 
regard Baumgarten says that human intellectual 
knowledge needs the mediation of signs (language, 
mathematics, etc.) making such knowledge abstract and 
notabiliter iners (remarkably inactive), while sensory 
cognition and persuasion have significant incentives for 
the mind, a pragmatic capacity he calls “foecunditas”; in 
the same way he named “prægnans” as a significantly 
animated perception. 
                                                 
5
 A. G. Baumgarten, Aesthetica (Halle, 1750), sec. 14. 
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"Fecund,” “pregnant": notice how this metaphor of life 
attributes to sense perception and sensibility a 
physiological connotation and power, which makes up 
the body of argumentative discourse (in Aristotelian 
terms, soma tes pisteos): a principle of form equipped 
with physiologically driving activity ("principium aliquod 
movens et agens", in the words of Daniel Coschwitz’s 
Organismus et Mechanismus,
6
 one of the masterworks of 
vitalistic medicine in the eighteenth century). In full 
compliance with the reclamation of our sensibility as a 
principle of action of the animated body, Baumgarten's 
Metaphysics stressed that our knowledge always takes 
place in relation to the location of our body in this 
universe, “pro positu corporis mei in hoc universo”
7
: this 
interaction between ontological foundation and 
physiological explanation that opens toward semiotics 
and rhetoric is, in my opinion, closer than one might 
think to the genesis of modern somaesthetics. 
 
Besides this historical perspective, I would also like to 
highlight from a theoretical perspective some of the 
descriptive powers of this sort of somaesthetic structure 
of analysis that links these different levels of the 
phenomenon, recognizing, on one hand, the autonomy 
of sense experience and its constraint within its 
ontological foundation and, on the other hand, the 
double opening of this constraint, considering 
possibilities and obligations of the living body. 
 
Exploring the status of the living body in the universe by 
exploring sensory experience also beyond the context of 
modern philosophy of art: such might be the motto of 
modern somaesthetics. 
 
This is exactly what leads us to examine somaesthetics in 
its second, more contemporary, set of roots, that is to 
say, its development of discussions of human nature 
between twentieth-century pragmatism and 
                                                 
6
 Daniel Coschwitz, Organismus et Mechanismus in 
homine vivo obvius et stabilitus (Leipzig, 1725), 178. 
7
 A. G. Baumgarten, Metaphysica (Halle, 1779), sec. 512. 
philosophical anthropology, along an axis that finds in 
John Dewey and Helmuth Plessner its most 
representative figures. To explore this conjunction of 
philosophical approaches to embodiment, Richard 
Shusterman and Hans-Peter Krüger devoted a three-year 
Humboldt Transcoop research project culminating in a 
conference in Potsdam in 2009 and an edited collection 
of new texts published (as separate special issues, in 
English and in German, respectively) in The Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy and the Deutsche Zeitschrift für 
Philosophie. To suggest two of the major topics of this 
exploration, one might ask what is the relationship of the 
soma of somaesthetics with the body/mind issue on one 
hand, and with the couple Körper/Leib, on the other? 
 
We must first remember the semantic richness of the 
word soma, whose meaning is not limited to the living 
body. Historically it extends, for example in Homer, to 
the opposite polarity of the corpse (soma opposed to 
démas),
8
 but also includes analogical transfers to the 
“body of discourse,” from its discursive articulations 
(soma also means “element of a structural organization”) 
to its value and function, which are always public and 
contextual, as seen in the above-mentioned 
characterization of Aristotelian rhetorical argumentation 
as soma tes pisteos, "body of persuasion." 
  
In its search for a unitary basis for a philosophy of man, 
early twentieth-century German thought has polemically 
resumed the Cartesian distinction between res cogitans 
and res extensa, using the perspective of the “unity of 
behavior,” that of a Umweltbeziehung, an organic 
relationship with the environment which is, in the words 
of Max Scheler, “indifferent to the psycho-physical point 
of view.” Through the encounter with the other, Scheler 
argued, we perceive neither body nor soul, but a unified 
whole, which manifests itself in individual units, in a 
living body indifferent to the psychophysical partition. 
 
                                                 
8
 On this subject see Valeria D'Agata's doctoral research 
now in progress at the University of Palermo, Italy. 
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We would, however, misunderstand the theoretical 
effort of philosophical anthropology if we forget the 
pragmatic component that animates it. Long before the 
systematic treatises of Max Scheler or Arnold Gehlen in 
this field, Viktor von Weizsäcker launched plans for a 
medical anthropology and psychosomatic medicine, 
important papers on anthropology and psychiatry were 
published by Binswanger and Straus, and Helmuth 
Plessner developed his dialogical reflections with 
Frederik Buytendijk on related themes. Here the 
relationship between health and disease, the function of 
“crisis” in questioning the unity of the human person, 
the meaning of expressive behavior were the main issues 
through which emerged an indifference to the division 
between the physical and the psychic. According to 
Plessner and Buytendijk, the sense of expressive 
movement arises in the reciprocity of the relationship 
with the environment, that is to say, in its indifference to 
the distinctions not only between the physical and the 
psychic and between subject and object but also, I would 
say, between activity and passivity. 
 
In cohering with the environment, the body adjusts, 
monitors, and directs itself; it creates—precisely through 
its relationship with the environment—its own horizon 
of meaning and time. In this way, expressive movement 
becomes the final test—or even more the effective 
experimental field—for a philosophical anthropology. 
That is, it becomes the field of human behavior in which 
we see most clearly how the principle of psychophysical 
nondifference guides the creation, the production and 
transformation of meaning, whose experience is 
expressed in the configuration of ever new forms. These 
include forms of physical existence and forms of 
production and sharing of meaning (Hans-Peter Krüger 
describes this, in a somewhat different way: 
Lebensformen und Lebenswissen). 
 
What I want to emphasize here is the close and constant 
correspondence between the structure of aesthetic 
experience and psychosomatic balance. 
This factor suggests that anthropology has no interest in 
cultivating a static opposition between the 
morphological structure of the body and its lived 
experience, between Körperlichkeit and Leiblichkeit. You 
could even see that one of the most significant paths 
that lead from the vitalistic functionalism of Jakob von 
Uexküll to the anthropological thought of Weizsäcker 
and Plessner is located in the dynamic integration of 
these two components. Consider, for example, 
Weizsäcker's attention to the change of functions that 
the physiological structure of the body can experience or 
Plessner’s very tight linkages between knowledge and 
action, between fundamental analysis of anthropological 
discourse and sociocultural construction of the person. 
Shusterman has observed that Plessner “avoids 
reification of the Leib as something inside the Körper. 
Neither an object nor a subject, the Leib is an aspect or 
form of behavior rather than a thing. It is the form of 
lived, experiential behavior that is differently lived and 
interpreted in the variety of cultures in which it is 
expressed.”
9
 
 
For their part Plessner and Buytendijk, in their great 
essay of 1925 on mimicry, make use of the word 
“Körperleib,” pointing out how the somatic unity/totality 
is established through its balance with the environment: 
“Körperleib und Umwelt aufeinander einspielen.”
10
 The 
living or lived body is not such because it can be felt from 
within and mastered impulsively, but rather because of 
its balance, because of its mutual dependence with the 
environment. Plessner and Buytendijk even come to 
claim that the agreement between the body and its 
environment constitutes, as an expression of the sphere 
of living behavior, “the existential form and perceptual 
form of animal and human bodies [Körperleiber].”
11
 With 
                                                 
9
 Shusterman, “Soma and Psyche,” 210. 
10
 Helmuth Plessner and Frederik Buytendijk, Die 
Deutung des mimischen Ausdrucks. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre 
vom Bewußtsein des anderen Ichs (1925), in Helmuth 
Plessner, Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2003), 7:121. 
11
 Ibid., 122. 
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its indifference to the division between subject and 
object, between mind and body, this relational 
environmental accord ensures the relational unity of 
experience with the content of experience. 
 
This is, I think, an extraordinary effort toward the notion 
of a concrete form of reason, that Plessner called an 
“aesthesiology of mind”: “Seeing, hearing, touching, 
every sensation, visualization, and perception, has the 
import of being fulfilled in an immediate presentation of 
the colors and shapes, the sounds, surface 
configurations, and solidity of the things themselves.”
12
 
This perceptual self-realization, one might add, comes 
through a (soma)aesthetic passage by which we are 
confronted with the solidity of things. 
 
The same Plessner, in his 1936 essay “Sensibilité et 
raison,” wrote that “human nature is not divided into a 
historical region and a region that would not be such”—
that would be somehow outside history and culture.
13
 
He thinks this dualism is based on the body/mind 
opposition. Liberation from a commitment to ahistorical 
knowledge, consequently, is nothing more than 
overcoming this body/mind dualism. Hence Plessner 
recommends the project of an historical science of the 
living body, a knowledge that will be, in his opinion, the 
foundation of a new systematic philosophy: “If man is a 
historical being,” Plessner writes, “he is this ‘in flesh and 
blood,’ as well as an object of the history of culture as an 
object of physiology. The body is a historical category.”
14
 
Living one's lived body, his own Leiblichkeit or his natural 
Leibsein, and reflecting and making reference to his 
being located in a body, in the sense of a Körperhabens, 
are always closely related, yet characterized by a 
continual tension. It is precisely in this sense that 
Plessner establishes, among the fundamental laws of 
                                                 
12
 Helmuth Plessner, Laughing and Crying: A Study of the 
Limits of Human Behavior, trans. James Spencer Churchill 
and Marjorie Grene (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1970), 41. 
13
 Plessner, Gesammelte Schriften, 7:136. 
14
 Ibid. 
anthropology, that of a “mediated immediacy” that a 
human being is forced to find and deploy to balance 
“between the physical thing [Körperding] which he 
somehow happens to be and the body [Leib] which he 
inhabits and controls.”
15
 
 
Plessner’s emphasis on the primacy of action and unity 
of behavior and his corresponding critique of the 
philosophy of the subject are aimed at understanding 
and representing this duality, which involves the role of 
consciousness and every relation to living beings: “I go 
walking with my consciousness, my body [Leib] is its 
bearer, on whose momentary position the selective 
content and perspective of my consciousness depend; 
and I go walking in my consciousness, and my own body 
[Leib] with its changes of position appears as the content 
of its sphere. To wish to make a decision between these 
two orders would mean to misunderstand the necessity 
of their mutual interlacing.”
16
 
 
And again: Man is not “just living body [Leib], nor does 
he just have a body [Leib (Körper)]. Every requirement of 
physical existence demands a reconciliation between 
being and having, outside and inside.”
17
 
 
We can conclude this brief account of Plessner’s somatic 
thought by agreeing with Shusterman that “the 
Körper/Leib distinction is clearly not a primordial, 
permanent ontological duality but, rather, a 
pragmatically functioning distinction in the practical 
behavior of persons.”
18
 
 
This view of the relationship between Körper and Leib, 
elaborated in the light of German anthropology, brings 
us to the meeting with John Dewey, whose conception of 
the body provides us, I believe, with the most complete 
                                                 
15
 Plessner, Laughing and Crying, 38. 
16
 Ibid., 36. 
17
 Ibid., 37. 
18
 Shusterman, “Soma and Psyche,” 211. 
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picture of what might be called the "somatic style" as an 
expression of an act of living body. 
 
Dewey’s concept of aesthetic experience is arguably one 
of the main references for Shusterman's pragmatist 
aesthetics, the theory which provides—along with the 
idea of a philosophy of lifestyle—the disciplinary 
framework from which somaesthetics was born. But 
experience, according to Dewey, always begins through 
an impulsion with which the living organism comes into 
contact with its environment. It is an impulsion that puts 
in motion the entire body and sets above all the body’s 
rhythmic relationship to the environment and the line 
that marks the boundary between the body and its 
exterior. It is always a rhythmic pattern and a mobile 
border, a pattern of expression of needs and 
opportunities (or constraints understood in the positive 
sense of this term) that link the living being with its 
environment: “The need that is manifest in the urgent 
impulsions that demand completion through what the 
environment—and it alone—can supply,” as Dewey says, 
“is a dynamic acknowledgement of this dependence of 
the self for wholeness upon its surroundings.”
19
 
 
I should emphasize the role a positive concept of 
“constraint” plays in Dewey’s somatic thought. In the 
first, narrower sense of constraint as a barrier, such 
constraint provides the emotional component of 
impulsion, underlining the role of the impulsion in the 
manifestation of the self. It is not unimportant that this 
first, positive meaning of constraint is signaled by 
Dewey’s pointing to the negative results of its absence: 
“Impulsion forever boosted on its forward way would 
run its course thoughtless, and dead to emotion. . . . Nor 
without resistance from surroundings would the self 
become aware of itself.”
20
 
 
                                                 
19
 John Dewey, Art as Experience (1934; repr., New York: 
Perigee Books, 2005), 61. 
20
 Ibid., 62. 
In its second positive sense constraint contributes 
actively to create the temporal shape specific to the 
organic impulsion. Resistance and environmental 
control, according to Dewey, “bring about the conversion 
of direct forward action into reflection; what is turned 
back upon [reflected] is the relation of hindering 
conditions to what the self possesses.”
21
 The element of 
reflection that occurs, Dewey says, is by no means simply 
a quantitative increase; it leads, instead, to a 
“qualitative” leap which originates in the 
“transformation of energy into thoughtful action.”
22
 
 
This is the function of constraint—both environmental 
and somatic: constraint gives birth and shape to a form 
of conduct that has no antecedent, a form of conduct 
whose characterization refers, in John Dewey’s words, to 
the temporal pattern of acquired experience: "the 
junction of the new and old is not a mere composition of 
forces, but is a re-creation in which the present 
impulsion gets form and solidity while the old, the 
‘stored,’ material is literally revived.”
23
 
 
Perhaps one should remember that Darwin is Dewey’s 
starting point for his theoretical understanding of the 
organized body: understanding the living organism 
means understanding its interaction with the 
environment, understanding it in the Darwinian sense of 
the term “mutual adaptation” that even allows us to 
speak of an organism and its environment.
24
 It is not 
possible to speak of an organism out of its “co-
evolutionary” relationship with the environment, nor to 
speak of a (biological) subject without starting from a 
continuous exchange of perspectives with the objects it 
encounters. 
 
In conclusion, having discussed Dewey’s vision of the 
important relationship between the organism’s 
                                                 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid., 63. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid., e.g., 45, 140. 
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impulsion experience and expression, I would like to 
compare it to Plessner’s. Plessner gives high importance 
to the living body’s autonomous expressive capacity, 
which makes the body and (selectively) its epidermal 
surface the meeting place of the active unity of the 
organism and its environment. 
 
We can perhaps recognize a path leading from the 
expressive manifestation of the animal body, through 
the exchange function of the epidermis, to human 
gestures, language, and the development of artistic 
expression: “In animals, too, the body as expressive 
surface is no passive envelope and external layer into 
which excitations boil over from within, but a felt 
boundary over against the environment. . . . Animals live 
in this relation, and—to the extent that he exists on this 
level—so does man. But only he knows of it.”
25
 This 
knowledge is followed by the special tonality of style that 
is typical of our expressive life—both its clarity and its 
setting up of distance—that makes it capable of an 
autonomous articulation of expressive materials, 
including abstract linguistic signs, without, however, 
denying the “character of being ‘organs of expression’” 
assigned by Plessner to the physical surface of the body 
and to the voice.
26
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Plessner, Laughing and Crying, 44. 
26
 Ibid., 44. 
To close by returning to somaesthetics and its concern 
with life and expressive styles of the self in its diverse 
and changing environments, Shusterman recently posed, 
in terms of a “metaphysics of somaesthetics,” the 
question of the relationship between the human soma, 
the self, and the person, given that there are “things we 
would attribute to the self or person that would not be 
attributed to her soma.”
27
 Here I see in somaesthetics—
reviving Baumgarten's project—the function of 
describing and leading to a higher level of perfection our 
lifestyles, that is to say, these rhythmic models that 
reflect and reshape—on different levels and discursive or 
expressive planes of argumentation—the constraints and 
opportunities for relationships between living beings and 
their environments. 
                                                 
27
 Shusterman, “Soma and Psyche,” 219–220. 
